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mandate, however, the courts should reach the same result, abandoning the
unfortunate minority rule followed by the California court in the Dearo case.
THE GIFT AND LEASEBACK: A NEW TAX
AVOIDANCE GIMMICK*
By one device after another wealthy breadwinners have sought to shift the
apparent ownership of taxable income to family members in lower surtax
brackets and still retain control of the transferred income or of the property
producing it.1 Though the courts have defeated many of these attempts, they
have never discarded the premise that each member of the family is an economic
entity. Thus they have refused to tax the grantor on income transferred within
his family unless he expressly reserves control of the income or its source.2
* Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948) ; Brown v. Commissioner, 180
F.2d 926 (3rd Cir. 1950), cert. grded, 18 U.S.L. VEEK 3348 (May 26, 1950).
1. Taxpayers have employed two kinds of devices to climb down the surtax ladder:
those which split up income among family members; and those which establish deductible
losses through transfers to family members. Income splitting has been attempted by joint
ownership of income-producing property, e.g., Mclnerney v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 665
(6th Cir. 1936) ; by assignment of income to persons who did not own the property or fur-
nish the consideration for which the income was derived, e.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S.
112 (1940) ; Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) ; by transfers of property which permit
another member of the family to take a profit on a subsequent sale, e.g., Weil v. Commis-
sioner, 31 B.T.A. 899 (1934), aff'd, 82 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 552
(1936); by compensation to family members for personal services, e.g., Biljac Holding
Corp. v. Commissioner, 5 CCH Tax Ct. Rep. 857 (1946); by means of a family partnership,
e.g., Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946); Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S.
733 (1949) ; by gifts of stock in a family corporation, e.g., Byerlyv. Commissioner, 154 F2d
879, 880 (6th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 735 (1946) ; and by establishment of a fam-
ily trust, e.g., Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
Establishment of losses has been attempted by loans to impecunious family members
on which a deduction is taken for bad debts, e.g., Thorn v. Burnet, 55 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir.
1932); and by sale of property to family members at a loss. See INT. Rzv. Cona §24(b)
(1) (A); McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694 (1947).
For fuller discussion of these devices see Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 675-677
(1933) ; Ryan, Federal Tax Treatment of the Family, 32 Mtn2. L. REv. 244 (1949), 33
MARQ. L. REv. 1 (1949); Note, 47 Cor. L. REv. 665 (1947); Note, 50 CoL. L Rv. 63
(1950); Mannheimer, Income Tax Status of Gifts of Family Corporation Stock, 25 Txns
604 (1947).
By paying a gift tax on the lifetime transfer of property under an income splitting de-
vice, taxpayers may also achieve estate tax savings. See note 26 infra. And where the tax-
payer establishes losses to family members, he may even save a gift tax.
2. See e.g., Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937). A much broader basis for
taxing income to the donor was suggested by the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Horst,
311 U.S. 112 (1940). The taxpayer had transferred unmatured negotiable interest cou-
pons from bonds held by him to his son who in turn collected the interest. Holding the
donor taxable on the interest, the court declared that". . . [the donor's] use of his economic
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This permits a well-to-do person to reduce his income tax without in fact chang-
ing his economic status. He simply makes a gift of stocks, bonds, or other
income-producing property to family members,3 who use the income for pur-
poses which he would have otherwise financed directly.
4
A new device, recently sanctioned by two federal courts of appeals, offers the
taxpayer a way to shift income to members of his family and still retain for his
own use the income-producing property. In Skemp v. Commissioner,* the tax-
payer, a physician, conveyed his clinic building in trust ;O income to be paid
gain, the right to receive the income, to procure a satisfaction which can be obtained only
by the expenditure of money or property, would seem to be the enjoyment of the income.
. . ." Id. at 117. Later decisions have not kept the Horst promise of satisfaction or enjoy-
ment as a basis for taxation. Horst has been limited to situations where the donor retains
control of the income-producing property. Pearce v. Commissioner, 315 U.S. 543, 554
(1942) ; Kohnstamm v. Pedrick, 153 F.2d 506, 508 (2d Cir. 1945).
Sections 166 and 167 INT. REV. CODE provide for taxing the settlor on income to re-
vocable trusts or to trusts where the income may be used for his benefit. Helvering v.
Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), presently stands as the broadest Supreme Court declaration
on when trust income will be taxed to the settlor. The oft-discussed factors which the
court felt were "relevant 'to the question of ownership" for income tax purposes were (1)
the short duration of the trust (2) the fact that the settlor's wife was beneficiary (3) the
settlor's control over the corpus. In view of these factors the court felt that there was
merely a "temporary reallocation of income within an intimate family group. Since the
income remains in the family and since the husband retains control over the investment,
he has rather complete assurance that the trust will not effect any substantial change in
his economic position." Id. at 335-336.
To provide more definite criteria for taxability in trust cases, the Treasury Depart-
ment published the Clifford regulations in 1945. The regulations go beyond even the Clif-
ford case. They tax the trust settlor on trust income, if the corpus or the income will re-
turn after a relatively short term of years; if the beneficial enjoyment of the corpus or
income is subject to the grantor's power of disposition; or if the corpus or income Is sub-
ject to administrative control exercisable for the benefit of the grantor. U.S. Treas. Reg.
111, § 29.22(a)-21 (1945).
The regulations do not expressly make family relationship between the settlor and
beneficiary of the trust a factor upon which tax liability of the settlor depends. But cf.
U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(a)-21(f) (1945). See generally, Eisenstein, The Clifford
Regulations and the Heavenly City of Legislative Intention, 2 TAx L. Rnv. 327 (1947).
3. Section 51(b) INT. R v. CODE provides for a husband-wife single tax return, It
permits a married couple to minimize surtaxcs by dividing their total income in half be-
fore computing the surtax and then multiplying the result by two. Thus the section elimi-
-nates a good deal of incentive to intra-family tax avoidance. However, wealthy bread-
winners can further divide their income by gifts to their children. The surtax is still "the
inverse reward of fertility." Clapp v. Heiner, 51 F.2d 224, 225 (3rd Cir. 1931).
4. The donor may compel use of the income for his own purposes by economic or
moral pressure on family members. He may just as effectively enjoy the income without
express instructions as to its use, by donating it in lieu of funds he would otherwise have
supplied-like an allowance. He will be taxed, though, on income employed to discharge
a legal obligation to support his children. INt. REv. CODE § 167(c) modifying -elvering
v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 170 (1942).
5. 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948).
6. The building was worth over $40,000. Brief for Petitioners, p. 22, Skemp v. Com-
missioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948). Settlor was probably taxable on the value of the
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monthly to his wife during her life and after her death to be used for the support
and education of his children. Although the settler retained no formal control
over the income, he did reserve an option to rent all or any part of the building
at a rental to be determined by the trustee.7 On the very day the trust agreement
was executed, the settlor exercised his option and leased back the entire trust
property for ten years with the privilege of renewing the lease for another ten.8
The lease provided that if the settlor died during its term, his executor had
the right to cancel it.
During the taxable year the settlor paid $3,800 as rentals to the trust.0 Of
this amount the trustee paid out $2,850 to the settlor's wife, who used the pay-
ments for "her health," travel, luxuries for herself, and luxuries and "things"
for the children.'0 There seems little doubt that the money turned over to the
wife was used for the same purposes for which the settlor's own funds wrould
have been used had he not created this arrangement."
In computing his income tax, the settlor deducted the rentals as business
expenses of the taxable year.'- The commissioner asserted a deficiency, con-
property under the gift tax. See dissenting opinion, Skemp v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 415,
422, 423 (1947).
7. The settlor also retained power to veto the sale or mortgage of the trust property,
and the right to direct the trustee to retain or sell any trust property. The trust agreement
further provided that the trustee is under "no liability for any loss arising from any action
taken or omitted to be taken at the direction of the settlor." Skemp v. Commissioner, 8 T.C.
415, 417 (1947).
8. Rent for the first two years was fixed at $500 a month. Thereafter it was to ha
determined by the trustee and the settlor. In the event of disagreement between them, it
was to be fixed by an arbitrator.
Under the lease the trust was bound to make all necessary repairs on the building and
to maintain the exterior. The taxpayer had to provide janitor service, heat, light and
water for the building and to pay for the insurance and taxes. S T.C. 415, 418-19 (1947).
9. 8 T.C. 415,419 (1947).
10. Brief for Respondent, pp. 18-19, Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F,2d 593 (7th Cir.
1948), quoting from Airs. Skemp's testimony before the Tax Court.
Airs. Skemp was not given instructions either by the settlor or the trustee as to how
the money was to be used. In fact, at the time of the hearing she had never seen the trust
agreement and did not know of its terms. Skemp v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 415, 419 (1947).
11. In 1941 the settlor's total income was $59,919.61 and his net income Q29,503.90.
In 1943 the settlor's net income was $42,088.88. Skemp v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 415, 419
(1947). Since the Tax Court found that Mrs. Skemp was in poor health and that she had
to travel to recuperate, it seems a fair inference that the settlor would have supplied the
money necessary for her health if there were no trust income. Similarly, the settlor prob-
ably would have underwritten luxury expenses in the absence of this arrangement.
12. The taxpayer claimed a deduction under § 23(a) of the INir. REV. CODE which pro-
vides for a deduction of "All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during
the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including ... rentals or other pay-
ments required to be made as a condition to the continued use or possession, for pur-
poses of the trade or business, of property to which the taxpayer had not taken or is not
taking title or in which he has no equity."
The original statute, 39 STAT. 759 (1916) provided "there shall be allowed as deduc-
tions-First. The necessary expenses actually paid in carrying on any business or trade.
." The statute was changed to its present form in 1919.
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tending that the rentals were not deductible.13 The Tax Court, upholding the
commissioner, pointed out that the settlor had placed the property in trust on
condition that he could get back use of the property by promising to make a
series of periodic payments. Since he got the use of the property back, he
merely gave his promise to make the periodic payments; and while the promise
might be legally binding, the payments were really gratuitous and hence not
deductible. 14  But the seventh circuit court of appeals reversed, holding that
the rentals satisfied the statutory test of deductibility because they were "re-
quired" for the continued use of the property.15
An alternative use of the gift and leaseback is illustrated by Brown vi. Com-
missioner.'6  The facts were essentially the same as those in the Skemp case-
a gift of property in trust on condition that it could be leased back by the
settlors.'7 In the Brown case, however, income to the trust was not to be paid
out until the beneficiaries reached their majority; there was thus no possibility
that the settlor would be able to control the use of the income in the near fu-
ture.'8 The commissioner argued that rentals and royalties paid under the
leaseback were not deductible by the settlors for, as he pointed out, their aim
was merely to make periodic gifts to their children.19 The Tax Court sustained
13. The Commissioner permitted Skemp to deduct $689.94 for depreciation on the trust
property. But he claimed a deficiency of $1,679.43. The claim was based on three grounds:
first, that no gift of the property had in fact been made (discussed more fully infra) ; sec-
ond, that the settlor retained sufficient dominion and control over the trust property that
he could be treated as the owner of the property under the Clifford and Sluari doc-
trines; and third, that the income should be taxed to the settlor because it was
used to discharge his legal obligation to maintain his wife. See note 4 supra. The Tax
Court did not consider the last two grounds. 8 T.C. 415, 420 (1947). The court of appeals,
in reviewing the Tax Court's decision, also ignored them.
14. 8 T.C. 415, 420-421 (1947). Judge Black dissented from the majority opinion. He
was impressed by the fact that the trustee was an independent corporation, that the $500
rentals were fair, and that the conveyance to the trust was beyond the settlor's recall.
15. 168 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1948). The court noted that "required" rental payments
were deductible, and unless violation of a fiduciary duty was to be imputed to the trustee,
the taxpayer was "required" to pay the monthly sums. Furthermore, the court was con-
vinced that the taxpayer's economic status had been changed by the gift. Since the rent
went into the wife's individual bank account, "of course [it] is her separate property."
16. 180 F.2d 926 (3rd Cir. 1950). Certiorari has been granted. 18 U.S.L. WEr: 3348
(May 26, 1950).
17. The settlors were a husband and wife engaged as partners in a coal milling busi-
ness. The trust corpus was composed of two properties: 8.9 acres of land upon which was
located a railroad siding used for transporting the settlors' coal; and 35 acres of coal land.
In the Brown case, unlike the Skemp situation, the trust agreement itself contained no
provision for the leaseback. But the properties were transferred to the trustee with the
understanding that they were to be leased back to the taxpayers, who would continue to
operate them as a partnership. Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926, 927 (3rd Cir. 1950),
18. The trustee did have full discretion to pay out of the income sums necessary for
the support, maintenance and education of any of the beneficiaries.
19. Gifts to family members are not deductible. INT. REV. CoDE § 23(o). In addition
to rentals deducted by the taxpayers, the commissioner included in their income $26 rent
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the commissioner, expressly declining to follow the seventh circuit's decision
in the Skemp case.20 But the third circuit, relying on the Skenip rationale,
reversed the Tax Court and upheld the deductions.21
In finding the rentals under a gift and leaseback deductible, the Skemp de-
cision opens the floodgates to intra-family tax avoidance. This device can now
be used for tax reduction by the many people who have no expendable income-
producing property. The avoidance-minded taxpayer need only make a con-
ditional gift2 2 of property useful in his business-be it land, buildings, auto-
mobiles, or machinery.2 3 By exercising his option to lease back the property,
he secures the full enjoyment of it for as long as he wishes,2  and at his death
paid by another person who used the railroad siding during the taxable year. The tax-
payers had paid this money to the trustee.
20. 12 T.C. 1095 (1949). Judge Arundell dissented on the ground that the case was
controlled by the Skemp decision.
The Tax Court majority felt that the gift and the leaseback were a single integrated
transaction. They pointed out that "for income tax purposes, if A purports to give B
$10,000, with the understanding that B will buy 100 shares of X stock from A, and B does
so, ... [a] single integrated transaction occurred and that was not a gift of $10,000
from A to B, but a gift of 100 shares of X stock." Similarly they felt that the gift and
leaseback were interdependent. "Petitioners never intended to and in fact never did part
with their right to mine coal from the acreage and load and ship the same from the siding,
which they transferred to the trusts. They merely intended and made a gift of their part-
nership income in the amounts of the contested 'rents' and 'royalties' to the trusts for their
children." 12 T.C. 1095 (1949).
21. Judge Kalodner dissented. He contended that the Tax Court's decision that the
rents and royalties paid by settlors were in reality gifts of partnership income was a fac-
tual conclusion. It was therefore not to be disturbed unless "clearly erroneous" under
INT. REv. CODE § 1141(a). This section made Tax Court decisions reviewable by circuit
courts to the same extent that district court decisions are under FED. IL Civ. P. 52(a). See
Commissioner v. Penn Athletic Club, 176 F.2d 939, 943 (1949). Since the finding of the
Tax Court was supported by evidence which permitted at most conflicting interferences, he
considered. it conclusive.
Treating the Tax Court's holding as a decision of law based on evidentiary facts
which were not in issue seems more reasonable. The courts are not clear on the point.
Compare Madeira v. Commissioner, 98 F.2d 556, 557 (3rd Cir. 1938) uith Manning v.
Gagne, 108 F.2d 718 (1st Cir. 1939). See also Wichita Terminal Elevator Co. v. Com-
missioner, 162 F.2d 513, 515 (10th Cir. 1947).
22. Although the Skemp and Brown rationales would logically be applicable to a
gift made directly to family members as well as to a gift in trust, the latter form will prob-
ably withstand judicial scrutiny more effectively. The two circuit courts were themselves
impressed by the fact that there were independent trustees involved. Skemp v. Commis-
sioner, 168 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1948); Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F2d 926, 929 (3rd
Cir. 1950).
23. Any property used "for purposes of trade or business" would satisfy § 23(a) (1)
(A). Exercising a little imagination, most persons could find some property of that de-
scription which they can give away and lease back.
24. In the Skemp case enjoyment woas reserved for twenty years. It may also be re-
served until the death of the settlor. If the property involved is a wasting asset, like the
Brown coal mines, it can be leased back for a period long enough to exhaust the asset.
This was the stated aim of the Brown settlors. See dissenting opinion of Judge Kalodner,
Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926, 930 (3rd Cir. 1950).
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it is retained by family members who would normally have received it as his
testamentary beneficiaries. Thus, with only slight change in his economic posi-
tion, the taxpayer reduces his taxable income by paying deductible rentals from
one pocket to another.25 And even where the taxpayer fully intends to pay
the rentals to a different pocket, as in the Brown case, he still achieves tax
savings. Since the gift and leaseback does not require that he part with the
use of the property, his rental payments are, in effect, deductible gifts to family
members.26
Concerned with the superficialities of the transaction, the two courts of ap-
peals found that the settlors were "required" to make the periodic rental pay-
ments. But the settlors were liable for the payments only because they volun-
tarily placed the property in trust and did not reserve a rent-free leasehold.
Rentals purposely provided for to achieve tax savings can hardly be considered
"required." 27
The Tax Court's appraisal of the gift and leaseback is far more realistic.
Family taxation has been treated by the courts as a practical matter concerned
with economic fact rather than with legal title and legal technicalities. 28 They
have consistently eliminated formal steps in otherwise integrated transactions
and have disregarded the conduits which would render the transactions tax-
1
25. Unless rentals are large enough to cut down surtax, the taxpayer may find that
he has paid more in a gift tax than he has saved in income tax. But where the rentals
are unreasonably high, the court may be more willing to find that they are gifts, cf. dissent-
ing opinion, Skemp v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 415, 422-423 (1948), or at least will limit the
deduction to a reasonable amount. Cf. Limericks, Inc. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 483 (5th
Cir. 1948).
26. Whether or not he controls the rentals, by making a lifetime gift rather than
testamentary transfer of the property, the taxpayer can achieve estate tax savings. Since
the estate tax base and gift tax base are independent, the property which would be subject
to the highest estate tax if retained till death is removed to the lower gift tax brackets.
Moreover, the gift tax allows a separate exemption of $30,000 as well as annual exclusions
of $3,000 for each donee. This means more savings by lifetime transfer. Finally, while
the amount paid out as under the estate tax is part of the base on which the tax is com-
puted, the amount paid as a gift tax is not included in the taxable estate.
By making a gift rather than a transfer at death, however, the taxpayer does lose
the advantages of INT. REV. CODE § 113(a) (5). This section provides that the tax basis
of property acquired by testamentary transfer in the hands of the transferee is the fair
market value at the time of acquisition. Thus by waiting until death to transfer his prop-
erty, the taxpayer can save his transferees a capital gains tax on the property appreciation
during his lifetime.
27. The courts have frequently asserted that income tax deductions are matters of
legislative grace and the burden of showing the right to the claimed deduction iv on the
taxpayer. See, e.g., Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943).
The mere fact that expenses are incurred as a result of contractual obligation does not
make them deductible. "The origin and nature, and not the legal form, of the expense
sought to be deducted determines the applicability of the words of § 23(a)." Id. at 594.
See also Deputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488, 494-497 (1940). In view of their origin, these
expenses can hardly be considered "required."
28. See Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 477-478 (1940).
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exempt.29  In Johnson v. Commissioncr,30 for example, the taxpayer gave
money to his wife which she placed in trust to be loaned back to him. The
second circuit court of appeals held that interest which the taxpayer paid to
his wife via the trustee was not deductible as a business expense. It decided
that the husband had not made a gift in the first place, since he only gave the
money to his wife to be loaned back to him. He merely made a gratuitous
promise to pay "interest." 31 The Johnson reasoning is applicable to the gift
and leaseback device. To make a valid gift, the donor must intend to part with
the property absolutely. Without such intent, the gift must fail.
Undoubtedly, the most practicable solution to the problem of intra-family
tax avoidance lies in legislative enactment requiring some form of return based
on total family income.32 Until such legislation is forthcoming, the courts are
29. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694 (1947) (deduction for loss
on exchange sale of stock is forbidden by § 24(b) as a loss from "sales or exchanges of
property, directly or indirectly ... between members of a family," if at time husband
sells on exchange, broker buys same kind of stock for wife's account).
Ingle Coal Corporation v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1949) presents an
interesting sequel to the Skemp case. The Ingle Coal Company, a closely held family cor-
poration, distributed its assets to its stockholders. They in turn transferred them to the
newly formed Ingle Coal Corporation. In return for the assets the Corporation agreed
to assume the liabilities of the Company and to pay the stockholders a royalty of $.05 for
each ton of coal mined. The Corporation then deducted royalty payments under § 23(a).
The Commissioner's claim that they were not deductible was upheld by the Tax Court
on the ground that the payments were in substance a dividend distribution. 10 T.C. 1199
(1948). Upholding the Tax Court, the seventh circuit court of appeals found that the
royalty payments were dividend payments. But even if they were assumed to be ex-
penses, they were not "necessary" expenses-for the company had the right to mine the
coal without paying royalties to its stockholders. The imposition of the royalties vas
thus not nwcessary for the continuance of its business. The court tried to distinguish the
Skemp case on the ground that in that case "there was a change in the taxpayer's status;
... he could only continue to occupy the building by paying the amount of rent fixed by the
trustee. In the case before us the transfer of property was not to an independent third
party but to a corporation which the same stocldolders controlled, and who had it
within their power to change or erase the overriding royalty obligations at any time they
chose."
30. 86 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1936).
31. See also, Elbert v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 685 (1941); cf. Guaranty Trust Co.
of New York v. Commissioner, 98 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1938). But cf. Preston v. Commissioner,
132 F.2d 763, 765 (2d Cir. 1942).
32. Two kinds of family return have been suggested; a mandatory joint return, or a
per capita return. The mandatory joint return would require that family earnings be
totaled and that the surtax be computed at a rate applicable to the sum. The per capita
return would e-x-tend present husband-wife income splitting to children. See note 3 supra.
Tax rates would of course be raised to make up the lost income.
The mandatory joint return has too many opponents to make it politically feasible.
A similar system of income taxation, attempted in Wisconsin, was declared unconstitu-
tional by the Supreme Court. Hoeper v. Tax Commission of Wisconsin, 234 U.S. 206
(1931). See Note, 10 Gao. WAsH. L. Rxv. 954 (1947); Surrey, Family Income and Fed-
eral Taxation, 24 TAxEs 980, 984-986 (1946). It is unlikely, however, that that decision
would be followed today.
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